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A topic of common interest to psychologists and philosophers is the spontaneous flow
of thoughts when the individual is awake but not involved in cognitive demands. This
argument, classically referred to as the “stream of consciousness” of James, is now
known in the psychological literature as “Mind-Wandering.” Although of great interest,
this construct has been scarcely investigated so far. Diaz et al. (2013) created the
Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire (ARSQ), composed of 27 items, distributed in
seven factors: discontinuity of mind, theory of mind (ToM), self, planning, sleepiness,
comfort, and somatic awareness. The present study aims at: testing psychometric
properties of the ARSQ in a sample of 670 Italian subjects; exploring the neural
correlates of a subsample of participants (N = 28) divided into two groups on the basis
of the scores obtained in the ToM factor. Results show a satisfactory reliability of the
original factional structure in the Italian sample. In the subjects with a high mean in the
ToM factor compared to low mean subjects, functional MRI revealed: a network (48
nodes) with higher functional connectivity (FC) with a dominance of the left hemisphere;
an increased within-lobe FC in frontal and insular lobes. In both neural and behavioral
terms, our results support the idea that the mind, which does not rest even when
explicitly asked to do so, has various and interesting mentalistic-like contents.
Keywords: resting state components, theory of mind (ToM), functional connectivity (FC), resting state fMRI
(rfMRI), graph analysis
INTRODUCTION
A classical topic of interest both for psychologists and philosophers has been the spontaneous
and autonomous ﬂow of thoughts that occurs when persons are awake, but not involved in
cognitive demands. This topic has been termed Mind-Wandering (MW) in the psychological
domain (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al., 2007; Gruberger et al., 2011).
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The ﬁrst attempt to conceptualize such a cognitive process
can be traced back to William James and his famous concept
of the “stream of consciousness” (William, 1892), that indicates
the continuous course of thoughts and feelings without a logical
structure. A typical example is the interior monolog, used in
psychological novels, such as the famous “Molly’s monolog” in
the novel “Ulysses” by James Joyce (1922). Over the past century,
the construct of MW has been identiﬁed by diﬀerent terms:
“day-dreaming” (Giambra, 1979), “task-unrelated images and
thoughts” (Giambra and Grodsky, 1989), “stimulus independent
thought” (Teasdale et al., 1995), “task-unrelated thought”
(Smallwood et al., 2003), “incidental self-processing” (Gilbert
et al., 2005), “spontaneous thought” (Christoﬀ et al., 2009) and
“inner speech” (Morin, 2009). Despite the interest, as showed by
the variety of terms created to identify it, the experimental study
of MW has been largely neglected. As Gruberger et al. (2011)
point out in their review, this may be due to the ontological
features of the construct itself, i.e., the fact that MW occurs
spontaneously and unintentionally, which makes it diﬃcult to
observe and measure it in the absence of external cues.
Initial observations of the activity of the resting brain occurred
quite accidentally in the second half of the past century. Ingvar
(1979, 1985) noted the presence of a speciﬁc and consistent
pattern of neural activation during the rest-task conditions,
and that the most important areas involved in this network
were the frontal regions. This idea of a speciﬁc neural network
underlying the resting condition remained unexplored for several
years, until the massive advent of neuroimaging techniques. The
growing importance of cognitive neuroscience and the increasing
use of its brain imaging methods, namely Positron emission
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), have allowed the observation of the brain networks
underlying MW. In fact, using PET and fMRI it was revealed
that resting brain activity involves many areas (Hampson et al.,
2002; Beckmann et al., 2005; Seeley et al., 2007; Greicius et al.,
2009). In this context, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the inferior parietal lobule
(iPL) were consistently identiﬁed. Moreover, it was postulated
that the hippocampal formation (HF) played a role as well,
even if its involvement remained controversial for a long time
because it depended on the speciﬁc aims of the studies (Buckner
et al., 2008). A crucial contribution for the advances of the
study of the MW and of its the neural basis came from Raichle
et al. (2001), who coined the construct of the “Default Mode
Network” (DMN), now a key construct in the study of the
human brain activity. The scientiﬁc literature has identiﬁed
the core regions involved in the DMN (Buckner et al., 2008):
ventral mPFC, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the
iPL, the lateral temporal cortex, the dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex, and the HF. Most interestingly, the DMN comprises
diﬀerent components with speciﬁc functions that are active and
interact in complex forms of cognition (for example creativity,
Beaty et al., 2014), in particular in social cognition. Recent
reviews and meta-analyses (see for example Schilbach et al.,
2008, 2012; Mars et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014) have conﬁrmed
that the DMN is involved in the complex activity of social
understanding, that comprises more speciﬁc dimensions such
as self-consciousness, the self-other distinction, the self-other
exchange (Schilbach et al., 2008), and the autobiographical
processes (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). A crucial ability for
a successful self-other distinction and self-other exchange is
theory of mind (ToM), or mindreading or mentalizing, i.e., the
ability to represent self and other’s mental states and to use
such meta-representations to understand, explain, and foresee
human behavior (Doherty, 2008). Over the past decades, the
psychological and neuropsychological literature has consistently
demonstrated that ToM typically develops during the preschool
and school-age period, and that it undergoes continuous changes
across the life-span. In particular, this ability, which is extremely
important for social aspects of life, undergoes signiﬁcant changes
both on the behavioral and on the neural level in successful
and unsuccessful neurocognitive aging (see for example Castelli
et al., 2010, 2011; Baglio et al., 2012; Cabinio et al., 2015). As
regards the most recent evidences concerning the neural basis
of MW, a meta-analytic review by Fox et al. (2015) highlighted
that focusing on the activation of the DMN alone may be overly
reductive for an exhaustive description of the neural basis of
spontaneous thought. In fact, they identiﬁed various regions,
among which those that classically belong to the DMN (such
as the medial prefrontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex) and
a series of regions outside the DMN (such as the secondary
somatosensory cortex and the insula). Therefore, in the present
study we decided to investigate the neural basis of MW following
a whole-brain approach, i.e., looking also at areas beyond just
the DMN.
Behavioral methods to study MW have been developed
only recently (Gruberger et al., 2011) and they have been
employed in association with brain imaging techniques.
Three types of methods are deeply related to the brain
imaging techniques: parametric modulation of self-relatedness,
parametric modulation of cognitive load, and paradigm-free
analysis of neuronal dynamics. In the ﬁrst approach, neural
activations during self-related tasks are compared to neural
activations at rest, when MW is supposed to occur most
frequently (see for example Gusnard et al., 2001). In the second
one, the contrast between the task-condition and the resting-
condition is the procedure of “the contrast of rest minus task.”
The idea at the basis of such a method was to demonstrate that
to a low cognitive load in a certain task condition corresponds
a high activation in the DMN areas during the task (see for
example Christoﬀ et al., 2004; McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason
et al., 2007). Finally, in the paradigm-free analysis of neuronal
dynamics, no behavioral paradigm is devised, because the
participants simply lie resting during the examination (see for
example Horovitz et al., 2008, 2009).
Two types of methods, instead, place more attention on
the behavioral evaluation of MW: real-time sampling, and
retrospective evaluation. In the former, participants have to
indicate whether or not they were experiencing a spontaneous
thought (i.e., not-linked to task performance) when they heard
an auditory stimulus during an fMRI scan session (see for
examples McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007; Christoﬀ
et al., 2009). In the latter, a questionnaire is proposed after
a resting session, without interrupting the MW experience,
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and asking the participants to recall the contents of the MW
activity. Even if the use of self-report methods is largely
employed in the psychological research, there is a paucity of
studies regarding MW with such a method. The ﬁrst and
few attempts in the past years (Giambra, 1979; Klinger and
Cox, 1987; Matthews et al., 1999) were not validated and
thus did not ﬁnd proper consideration in the neuroscientiﬁc
literature. In recent years, three attempts to develop self-
report measures of the resting activity deserve consideration.
D’Argembeau et al. (2005) asked participants to rate the amount
of thoughts experienced, regardless of their content, in a
questionnaire immediately after the fMRI session. Delamillieure
et al. (2010) devised the Resting State Questionnaire, which
consists of 62 items that cluster ﬁve main types of mental
activity: visual mental imagery, inner language, somatosensory
awareness, inner musical experience, and mental manipulation
of numbers. Participants retrospectively rate the proportion
of time spent in each mental activity during the resting-state
fMRI (rfMRI) acquisition using a 0–100% scale. Recently, Diaz
et al. (2013) created the Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire
(ARSQ), a 27 items instrument, and administered it after a
5-min resting session in a non-fMRI session, in order to
investigate the MW in a pure behavioral manner. This procedure
has the advantage to limit the possible distortion due to
the experimental peculiarities of fMRI acquisition. Through
exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor analyses (EFA and ECA),
they identiﬁed seven factors: discontinuity of mind, theory of
mind, self, planning, sleepiness, comfort, and somatic awareness.
Stoﬀers et al. (2015) identiﬁed 11 positive associations between
brain- functional network connectivity and ARSQ dimensions.
Speciﬁcally, “Sleepiness”, “Visual Thought”, and “Discontinuity
of Mind” appeared to be signiﬁcantly associated with functional
connectivity within the Visual, Sensorimotor and Default Mode
networks.
The present study aims at evaluating for the ﬁrst time the
seven-factor structure of the ARSQ in an Italian sample, and at
exploring the neural correlates of a subsample of participants
divided in two groups on the basis of the scores obtained in
the ToM factor. In particular, for the rfMRI analysis we used
an approach well described in the literature (Achard et al., 2006;
van den Heuvel et al., 2008; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Tyszka
et al., 2014) to examine all the areas of the whole-brain network.
Furthermore, since the literature has shown a partial overlap
between areas associated with MW areas and those with the ToM
network, particularly the mPFC/anterior cingulate cortex, we
decided to focus on the possible correlation between the neural
areas activated during the resting session and the respective
ToM degree that has engaged the mind during the session
itself.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Data were obtained from 670 participants that completed the
ARSQ. Most of our sample (n = 400) was obtained from
students enrolled at the Catholic University of Milan and
Piacenza. Moreover, students of other Universities in Italy were
contacted using social network and mailing lists provided by
student organizations (n = 193). Finally, we handed out the
questionnaire to a sample of people (n = 70) already involved in
another study at Don Gnocchi Foundation in Milan. According
to the recommendations of the Declaration of Helsinki about
ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects,
both local ethics committee approval of the Don Gnocchi
ONLUS Foundation and written informed consent from all
subjects to participate in the study were obtained before study
initiation.
Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire
On the basis of research by Diaz et al. (2013), we administered
the ARSQ to test its structure and reliability in an Italian sample.
Although an updated version of the questionnaire was recently
published by the same research group (Diaz et al., 2014), it was
not available when we started our study. The measurement of
resting state through ARSQ is done in two steps: in the ﬁrst,
the participant is required to experience a resting state session,
i.e., to remain alone for 5 min in a quiet and silent room, in a
comfortable position with the eyes closed. Participants are also
recommended to free the mind from all thoughts, and to set an
alarm that will alert when the 5 min of the resting session have
passed. In the second step, participants are required to ﬁll out the
questionnaire about sensations and thoughts experienced during
the resting session.
The 27 items of the ARSQ and the ﬁve control items were
translated into Italian with the back-translation procedure. The
control items aim to evaluate whether the participants performed
the questionnaire properly. Participants are asked to express
their agreement with each item using a ﬁve point Likert scale:
1 = “Completely Disagree,” 2 = “Disagree,” 3 = “Neither Agree
or Disagree,” 4 = “Agree,” and 5 = “Completely Agree.” Diaz
et al. (2013) identiﬁed and conﬁrmed a structure of seven factors:
discontinuity of mind, theory of mind, self, planning, sleepiness,
comfort, and somatic awareness (see Table 1).
After dataset constructions we ﬁltered the sample on the
basis of the control items in order to ensure the inclusion of
participants who had completed the resting state session before
ﬁlling in the questionnaire. More speciﬁcally, the subjects who
responded less than “agree” at least to one of the questions
“I felt motivated to participate,” “I had my eyes closed” and
“I was able to rate the statements” or less than disagree at
least to one of the questions “I have diﬃculty remembering
my thoughts” and “I have diﬃculty remembering my feelings”
were excluded from the sample. We also removed those
subjects who did not complete the entire questionnaire. The
ﬁnal sample consisted of 304 subjects (Mage = 29.26 years,
SDage = 11.04).
MRI Acquisition Protocol
A sub-group of the whole dataset, which included 28 healthy
right-handed subjects (mean age ± SD = 54.32 ± 18.79 years;
range: 21–79 years; nine males), was acquired at Don Gnocchi
Foundation, IRCCS Santa Maria Nascente (Milan, Italy), using a
1.5 T Siemens Magnetom Avanto (Erlangen, Germany) magnetic
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TABLE 1 | Control items and seven-factor structure of the ARSQ.
Control items • I felt motivated to participate
• I have difficulty remembering my thoughts
• I have difficulty remembering my feelings
• I had my eyes closed
• I was able to rate the statements
Discontinuity of mind • I felt restless
• I had busy thoughts
• I had my thoughts under control
• I had rapidly switching thoughts
• I had difficulty holding on to my thoughts
Theory of mind • I thought about others
• I thought about people I like
• I place myself in other peoples’ shoes
Self • I thought about my feelings
• I thought about my behavior
• I thought about myself
Planning • I thought about my work/study
• I thought about solving problems
• I thought about the past
• I thought about the future
• I had deep thoughts
• I thought about things I need to do
Sleepiness • I felt tired
• I felt sleepy
• I had difficulty staying awake
Comfort • I felt comfortable
• I felt relaxed
• I felt happy
Somatic awareness • I thought about my health
• I was conscious of my body
• I thought about my heartbeat
• I thought about my breathing
resonance imaging (MRI) scanner with an 8-channel head coil.
All the subjects had no history of neurological, cardiovascular,
or metabolic disorders and voluntarily participated in the
study.
Resting state fMRI (rfMRI), BOLD EPI images were collected
at rest for approximately 6.6 min (TR/TE = 2500/30 ms;
resolution = 3.1 mm× 3.1 mm× 2.5 mm;matrix size= 64× 64;
number of axial slices = 39; number of volumes = 160).
Subjects were instructed to keep their eyes closed, not to
think about anything in particular, and not to fall asleep.
High resolution T1-weighted 3D scans were also collected
(TR/TE = 1900/3.37 ms; resolution = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm;
matrix size = 192 × 256; number of axial slices = 176) to be
used as anatomical references for rfMRI analysis. After the rfMRI
session, the ARSQ was administered, as in Diaz et al. (2013).
rfMRI Data Analysis
Pre-processing of rfMRI data was carried out using FSL
(Smith et al., 2004; Jenkinson et al., 2012). Standard pre-
processing involved the following steps: motion correction
with Motion Correction Linear Image Registration Tool
(MCFLIRT – Jenkinson et al., 2002); non-brain tissues removal
with Brain Extraction (BET; Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing
with a 5 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian
kernel; high-pass temporal ﬁltering with a cut-oﬀ frequency
of 0.01 Hz. Single-subject spatial independent component
analysis (ICA) with automatic dimensionality estimation was
performed using MELODIC (multivariate exploratory linear
optimized decomposition into independent component) 3.0
(Beckmann and Smith, 2004). Subsequently, each subject’s
dataset was cleaned from artifacts using the FMRIB’s ICA-
based Xnoiseiﬁer (FIX) toolbox (Griﬀanti et al., 2014; Salimi-
Khorshidi et al., 2014), as it has been shown that FIX is
a good approach for data denoising (Pruim et al., 2015)
and is more eﬀective than other approaches in detecting
functional alterations in a small-sample population and using
a clinical scanner (Griﬀanti et al., 2015). The 24 motion
parameters (i.e., the six rigid-body time series, their backward-
looking temporal derivatives and the squares of the twelve
resulting regressors) estimated by MCFLIRT were also regressed
out.
After the pre-processing, each single-subject 4D dataset
was aligned to the subject’s high-resolution T1-weighted
image using linear registration (FLIRT, Jenkinson and
Smith, 2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002) with the brain-boundary
registration cost function (BBR, Greve and Fischl, 2009),
registered to MNI152 standard space using Non-linear
Image Registration Tool (FNIRT, Andersson et al., 2007a,b),
and subsequently resampled to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm
resolution.
Regions of Interest
Resting state fMRI signal was extracted from the regions of
interest (ROIs) deﬁned by anatomical parceling the cortical areas
using the Harvard-Oxford atlas (Frazier et al., 2005; Desikan
et al., 2006; Makris et al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2007), as seen
in previous studies (Davis et al., 2013; Tyszka et al., 2014).
The maximum overlap discrete wavelet transform (Percival and
Walden, 2000) was then used to decompose the time series into
wavelet coeﬃcients at four scales (scale 1: 0.0066–0.0075; scale
2: 0.0075–0.016 Hz; scale 3: 0.016–0.0364 Hz; scale 4: 0.0364–
0.1 Hz) and estimate the wavelet-correlation matrices at each
scale (Achard et al., 2006). We focused on scale 4 (0.0364–
0.1 Hz), in which the spontaneous low-frequency oscillations of
the BOLD signal are mostly located (Fransson, 2005).
The wavelet-correlation matrices were used for estimating
possible functional connectivity (FC) dependencies with the ToM
factor. Subjects were divided in two groups, i.e., high-ToM and
low-ToM, each composed by 14 subjects, depending on the mean
score (respectively higher or equal/lower than 3, which is the
arithmetic mean across the possible ToM scores in the range:
1–5) that the subject obtained in the answers to the three items of
the factor of theory of mind (“I thought about others,” “I thought
about people I like,” and “I placedmyself in other people’s shoes”).
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the high-ToM and low-ToM
groups were assessed with a two-sample unpaired t-test using the
Network Based Statistic toolbox (NBS, Zalesky et al., 2010).
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RESULTS
Preliminary Confirmation of the Original
7-Factor ARSQ Structure
Descriptive analyses on the items were conducted. All the items
showed a normal distribution (skewness and kurtosis < 1.5). In
order to test the original structure that emerged from the ARSQ
data analysis we performed a conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA)
with MPlus software 6.11 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2011) on
the dataset with 27 items extracting in seven factors. The results
conﬁrmed that the original model adapts to the Italian data,
showing acceptable indices of ﬁt and parameters substantially in
line with those of the original study (Diaz et al., 2013; see Tables 2
and 3). Composite reliability (Bagozzi, 1994) proved well-above
0.80 for all the factors except for “ToM” where the value was 0.66.
All the items signiﬁcantly saturated the respective latent factors.
However, ten items did not saturate at more than 0.40, of which
only one item of the factor “Somatic” showed a value lower than
0.2 (range: 0.17–0.88).
Resting State fMRI
All the subjects completed the MRI session; no structural
alterations were found. Age and sex matching between
the two groups were respectively veriﬁed by means of
two-sample unpaired t-test and Chi-squared test (low-
ToM: mean age = 49.36 ± 18.22, three males, mean ToM
factor = 1.86 ± 0.68; high-ToM: mean age= 59.28 ± 18.65 years,
six males, mean ToM factor = 3.31 ± 0.36).
Wavelet-correlation Matrices
We evaluated the FC diﬀerences between the two groups with
a two-sample unpaired t-test and identiﬁed a sub-network
with higher values of FC in high-ToM compared to low-ToM.
Figure 1A shows FC of the 48 sub-network nodes (see Table 4
for details), expressed as the mean z-score across the subjects
belonging to the low-ToM (top) and high-ToM (middle) groups.
Six main regions were identiﬁed and highlighted with diﬀerent
colors along the diagonal: the frontal lobe (16 nodes, red box),
the parietal lobe (eight nodes, green box), the insular lobe (three
nodes, yellow box), the limbic lobe (ﬁve nodes, light-blue box),
the temporal lobe (nine nodes, purple box), and the occipital
lobe (seven nodes, orange box). The 48 nodes reported in detail
in Table 4. To note, among those nodes it is possible to detect
some core areas belonging to the DMN (medial frontal gyrus,
iPLs, parahippocampal gyrus and precuneus) and to the salience
network (insula and cingulate gyrus). The last row of Figure 1A
reports the statistical results of the two-sample unpaired t-test
(high-ToM > low-ToM, p < 0.05, NBS-corrected for multiple
comparisons). Figure 1B shows a graph with the 48 nodes of
the sub-network and the edges relative to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
of FC between the two groups. This graph indicates a marked
functional asymmetry between the left and the right hemispheres,
as it shows more signiﬁcantly diﬀerent FC in the left hemisphere
than in the right one. Globally, Figure 1 highlights a greater
FC variation in the frontal and insular lobes compared to the
others.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present study aimed at conﬁrming the factorial structure of
the ARSQ and at exploring the neural correlates of the factor of
theory of mind of the ARSQ thorough brain imaging techniques.
The results of the CFA have showed satisfactory ﬁt indexes,
supporting the seven factors structure originally found by Diaz
et al. (2013). The conﬁrmation of the seven factors structure
contributes to measure the human mind activity, that appears
to be restless even when persons are required to think about
nothing. The results have also highlighted the presence of
a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the levels of the FC
of 48 nodes between the subjects with a low mean in the
factor of Theory of Mind (low-ToM) and the subjects with
a high mean in the factor of theory of mind (high-ToM),
i.e., subjects who report having thought a lot about other
persons. In particular, our functional whole-brain network
TABLE 2 | Fit indices for the models in Diaz et al. (2013) and current study samples.
Models X2 (p) Df, N RMSEA (90% C.I.) SRMR CFI
Diaz et al., 2013, #11685 2455.63 (<0.001) 303, 813 0.093 - 0.88
Present study 577.28 (<0.001) 303, 304 0.055 (0.048–0.061) 0.068 0.84
TABLE 3 | Correlations among factors.
DoM ToM Self Plan Sleep Comfort SomA
DoM –
ToM 0.58∗∗(0.36) –
Self 0.51∗∗(0.58) 0.13 (0.59) –
Plan 0.59∗∗(0.58) 0.33∗∗(0.70) 0.60∗∗(0.21) –
Sleep 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.11) −0.04 (0.24) 0.22∗(0.21) –
Comfort −0.47∗∗(−0.72) −0.03 (0.04) −0.07 (−0.27) −0.24∗∗(0.20) −0.06 (−0.25) –
SomA −0.15∗(0.35) −0.12 (0.27) 0.18∗(−0.71) −0.02 (0.48) −0.00 (0.31) 0.09 (−0.30) –
∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Sub-network functional connectivity (FC) matrices among the 48 nodes (frequency range: 0.0364–0.1 Hz), averaged across the subjects belonging
to the two groups: low-ToM (top) and high-ToM (middle); on the bottom, the statistical results for the contrast high-ToM > low-ToM (pNBS−corr ≤ 0.013).
Within-region FC is arrayed on diagonal blocks; between-region FC appears in off diagonal blocks. Colored boxes denote lobe membership: red = Frontal Lobe;
green = Parietal Lobe; yellow = Insular Lobe; light-blue = Limbic Lobe; purple = Temporal Lobe; orange = Occipital Lobe. The color bars indicate the FC range
(z-score: −1÷9) for the low-ToM and high-ToM connectivities matrices and the statistically significant p-values in grayscale (pNBS−corr > 0.013 are black colored).
(B) Graph representation of FC differences between the two groups. The edge size is proportional to the extent of FC difference between high-ToM and low-ToM.
Within-region edges are represented with the color of their own region; between-region edges are colored in gray.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1855
Marchetti et al. ToM, Functional Connectivity, Resting State
TABLE 4 | Characterization of the 48 cortical areas extracted from the Harvard-Oxford atlas with higher values of functional connectivity in high-ToM
compared to low-ToM.
# Coordinates (x, y, z) Hemisphere Lobe Area
1 −25, 53, 8 L Frontal Middle frontal gyrus (BA10)
2 26, 52, 9 R Frontal Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10)
3 −15, 18, 57 L Frontal Superior frontal gyrus
4 15, 18, 58 R Frontal Superior frontal gyrus
5 −38, 18, 42 L Frontal Middle frontal gyrus
6 −51, 15, 15 L Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44)
7 52, 15, 16 R Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44)
8 −27, 24, −16 L Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)
9 29, 23, −16 R Frontal Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)
10 −34, −12, 49 L Frontal Middle frontal gyrus
11 35, −11, 50 R Frontal Middle frontal gyrus (BA 6)
12 −6, −3, 56 L Frontal Medial frontal gyrus
13 6, −3, 58 R Frontal Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6)
14 −6, 21, −16 L Frontal Subcallosal gyrus
15 6, 20, −16 R Frontal Subcallosal gyrus
16 49, −6, 11 R Frontal Precentral gyrus
17 49, −28, 22 R Parietal Inferior parietal lobule
18 −29, −49, 58 L Parietal Inferior parietal lobule
19 29, −48, 59 R Parietal Inferior parietal lobule
20 −55, −46, 34 L Parietal Inferior parietal lobule
21 −50, −56, 29 L Parietal Supramarginal gyrus
22 −8, −60, 37 L Parietal Precuneus
23 9, −58, 38 R Parietal Precuneus
24 −32, −73, 38 L Parietal Precuneus
25 41, 19, 5 R Insular Insula
26 38, 3, 0 R Insular Insula
27 −48, −32, 20 L Insular Insula (BA 13)
28 7, −36, 30 R Limbic Cingulate gyrus (BA 23)
29 −7, 37, 21 L Limbic Anterior cingulate (BA 32)
30 7, 36, 23 R Limbic Anterior cingulate (BA 32)
31 −22, −32, −17 L Limbic Parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36)
32 −36, −29, −25 L Limbic Parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36)
33 −45, −20, 7 L Temporal Superior temporal gyrus (BA 13)
34 −40, 11, −30 L Temporal Superior temporal gyrus
35 41, 13, −29 R Temporal Superior temporal gyrus
36 −56, −4, −8 L Temporal Middle temporal gyrus
37 57, −1, −10 R Temporal Middle temporal gyrus (BA 21)
38 −53, −30, 11 L Temporal Superior temporal gyrus (BA 41)
39 −57, −53, 1 L Temporal Middle temporal gyrus
40 −52, −53, −17 L Temporal Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20)
41 −33, −54, −16 L Temporal −
42 −13, −66, −5 L Occipital Lingual gyrus (BA 18)
43 27, −75, −12 R Occipital Lingual gyrus
44 −9, −80, 28 L Occipital Cuneus (BA 19)
45 −17, −96, 7 L Occipital Cuneus
46 −45, −76, −2 L Occipital Middle occipital gyrus
47 −10, −75, 8 L Occipital Cuneus (BA 23)
48 12, −74, 8 R Occipital Cuneus (BA 23)
#, Identification number; BA, Brodmann area; L, left; R, right.
analysis showed that high-ToM subjects show more FC in the
frontal lobe and in the insula, with a dominance of the left
hemisphere.
The mPFC, a core region of the DMN, has been consistently
identiﬁed as part of a circumscribed neural circuit underlying
mentalizing (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006;
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Schurz et al., 2014). Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that
connectivity within the frontal lobes facilitates mentalizing
ability. The evidence of frontal lobe involvement in ToM is in line
with previous MRI results provided over the past years (see for
example Stone et al., 1998), also by lesion studies: subjects with
frontal lobes lesions show deﬁcits in the solution of ToM tasks
(see for example Rowe et al., 2001; Bird et al., 2004).
Without any intention to establish a causal relation
between neural activation and psychological activity during
resting state, it is possible to argue that the higher FC in
the areas involved in the voluntary control of behavior,
consciousness and executive function may depend on two
reasons. In the ﬁrst case higher FC may express the attempt
to “control” the mental activity in order to comply with
the experimental instruction “to free the mind from every
kind of thoughts.” In the second case, the unrested mind
involves itself in thinking about others by using the frontal
lobe connectivity to decouple its own perspective from that of
other’s.
Interestingly, our ﬁndings show that the FC changes are not
limited to the areas belonging to the DMN, but are extended to
include other networks. In fact, the insula is part of the “salience
network,” which is impaired by damages to the frontal lobes.
In terms of functionality, the insula mediates feelings linked
with speciﬁc emotional states (Damasio et al., 2000; Critchley
et al., 2004, 2005), revealing its role in binding cognition and
emotion (Kurth et al., 2010). The insula is also involved in social
emotion processing (Lamm and Singer, 2010), i.e., the aﬀective
states that we experience in the interaction with other people
and that are related to the social context. It may be important
to remember that the items of the factor of theory of mind were
“I thought about others,” “I thought about people I like,” and “I
placed myself in other people’s shoes” and that the insula has
been found to be active in various type of ToM tasks, especially
in the Eyes Test that evaluates the mindreading ability through
eye gaze (Schurz et al., 2014). The insular cortex may also be
considered the main cortical locus of an interoceptive system that
regulates aﬀective feeling states from the skin (Olausson et al.,
2002; Loken et al., 2009). In the light of these evidences, the
higher insular FC in High-ToM subjects may express the ﬁrst-
person experience with others in terms of aﬀective and emotional
feelings and in terms of proximal and proprioceptive involvement
with them.
It is interesting to notice that the ability of mentalizing, as
measured by the ToM factor in terms of “thinking about others,”
implies on the neural level the involvement of brain areas linked
both to the cognitive and the aﬀective components, namely
the frontal lobes and the insula, respectively. The functional
asymmetry between the hemispheres with signiﬁcantly higher
FC in the left side can presumably be connected with the
construct of narrative thought (Bruner, 1990). According to
Bruner, ToM would be better understood if reworded in terms of
autobiographical construction of the self. The latter is grounded
on language that neuroscientiﬁc evidences posit as a prevalent left
hemisphere activity.
This study has also some limitations. Although the CFA
showed satisfactory parameters, the moderate reliability of the
items of the ToM factor should suggest a cautious generalization
of the results about the correlation between fMRI evidences and
the ToM latent factor.
Future research will have to increase the number of items
of the ToM factor. A greater number of behavioral details of
the resting-mind contents may support a more comprehensive
interpretation of the neural variability. Finally, the cross-cultural
invariance should be investigated comparing Dutch and Italian
results.
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